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A "COMPARATIVE" ANALYSIS OF THE ACADEMIC
FREEDOM OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
VIKRAM AMAR*
One of the topics we have been asked to address at this sym-
posium is the academic freedom enjoyed by faculty at public univer-
sities. Now is a good time to be discussing this topic, and the Univer-
sity of North Carolina ("UNC") is a particularly apt place at which to
be discussing it. As would two other places I've spent professional
time at recently-the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ("U
of I"), where I became the Dean of the College of Law this year, and
the University of California system ("UC"), where I spent my academ-
ic career until this fall. Indeed, given the dust-ups here at UNC,' the
controversy surrounding the (non)hiring of Steven Salaita at the U of
I,2 and the UC Office of the President's guidance concerning, and
possible definitions of, microaggressions,3 it is fair to say these three
* Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of
Law. This Essay is a modified version of remarks delivered at the "Free Speech
in Higher Education" Symposium sponsored by the First Amendment Law Re-
view of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on October 30, 2015.
1 The University and the state's elected leaders have been at odds over a variety
of programs and policies in recent years. For one perspective criticizing the pol-
iticians' review of university operations, see Gene Nichol, Gene Nichol's Response
to Recommendation by Board of Governors' Group to Close UNC Poverty Center,
NEws & OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/op-
ed/article10876403.html.
2 For background on the Steven Salaita controversy (involving the University's
2014 decision not to follow through with a tenured appointment for Professor
Salaita based on controversial tweets and other social media utterances he
made), see Report on the Investigation into the Matter of Steven Salaita, Univ. of
Ill., Urbana-Champaign's Comm. on Academic Freedom & Tenure (CAFT),
http://www.ais.illinois.edu/documents/CAFTReport.pdf (last visited March 12,
2 016) [hereinafter CAFT Report].
3 "Microaggressions," which can lead to a legally actionable hostile learning en-
vironment, are defined for these purposes as "the everyday verbal, nonverbal,
and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional or uninten-
tional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages to target
persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership." For the
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great public universities lie at the epicenter of the conflict between
freedom of expression and the orderly operation of public higher
education.
In my (necessarily) abbreviated contribution on this topic, I'd
like to examine the breadth of so-called "academic freedom" enjoyed
by (even fully tenured) faculty at public universities by comparing
the scope of liberties of public professors with relevant counterparts.
For these purposes, I focus primarily on the liberties enjoyed by vir-
tue of the federal Constitution-freedoms that arise from state con-
stitutions or contract law are important to be sure, but they fall
largely outside of my remarks today.
The first relevant comparison I'd like to draw is between
public university faculty and public university students. It seems
clear that the First Amendment, at least, protects students far more
than it protects faculty. The reason for this is relatively simple-
students are regulated individuals (campuses are operated like small
municipalities), whereas faculty are government employees. Settled
(albeit somewhat vague) First Amendment doctrine gives the gov-
ernment far more latitude to regulate the speech of its workers than
the speech of its citizenry, both because the smooth functioning of
government departments is an interest that is weighed against free-
dom of speech, and (in some settings) because government itself
speaks through the actions of its employees. These basic notions,
which find expression at the U.S. Supreme Court in modern cases in
the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti line4 are captured, albeit somewhat
flippantly, by the quip of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who (while serving
as a state appellate judge at the time) remarked: "[A person] may
guidance the University of California Office of the (System) President (UCOP)
had been giving on recognizing microaggressions and the messages they send,
see the following chart that UCOP had disseminated:
http://academicaffairs.ucsc.edu/events/documents/MicroaggressionsExampl
es_Arial_2014_11_12.pdf [hereinafter, Microaggression Avoidance Guide].
4 The seminal case remains Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The
Court explained and refined the Pickering doctrinal framework in Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Taken
individually and together, these rulings (and others in the same line) illustrate
the latitude the government has to regulate the expressive activity of its em-
ployees in different government employment contexts.
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have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman."5
We need look back to Holmes's quip to see the basic point.
Consider the aforementioned UC's microaggression guidance docu-
ment While vague as to the implications of noncompliance, the UC
guidance memo certainly intimates that when faculty and staff use a
phrase like "America is a melting pot" they are engaging in a micro-
aggression that may be creating a legally actionable hostile learning
environment No public university could even intimate to a student
(as opposed to a faculty member) that there could be punishment for
using such a phrase, no matter the context in which that phrase was
invoked.6 Nor could any public university visit negative conse-
quences on any student for posting on social media the intemperate
(and in the minds of many people anti-Semitic) things that Steven
Salaita tweeted.
Let us next compare public professors to professors at pri-
vate higher education institutions. Here too, it seems that the public
professoriate is entitled to less in the way of First Amendment pro-
tections. Again, think about the microaggression memo or the Salaita
affair: Can anyone imagine government trying to directly sanction
Duke University (to pick a nondescript private school up the road)
professors for saying, regardless of context, "I believe the most quali-
fied person should get the job" (another specific example of potential
microagression according to the UC) or for extreme and offensive
tweets about deeds of Israelis? Or, go back a few generations-it is
no surprise that the flashpoint over state-imposed loyalty oaths at
universities tended to occur at public institutions.' Even in the
1950's, my guess is that government-mandated loyalty oaths at Har-
vard would have been a tough sell. And once more, the reason for the
s McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
6See Microaggression Avoidance Guide, supra note 3.
7See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
8 See Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 Green Bag 2d 17,
22-23 (2005).
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asymmetrical treatment is the related doctrines of public-employee
speech and government speech.9
Now consider the First Amendment protections of public
professors compared to other public employees. At first blush, it
would seem that here, public professors are at least on equal terms
with the group (other public employees) to which they are being
compared. After all, if the employer/employee relationship gives
government certain leeway to regulate, that would seem to apply to
non-professorial employees too. True enough, but closer inspection
reveals that under the Pickering/Connick/ Waters line of cases,to pro-
fessors may fare more poorly than many other government em-
ployees, for two reasons. First, government discrimination concern-
ing the content of public professor speech is inevitable and
necessary (in a way that is not true for other public employees). Pub-
lic employers (whether they be Boards of Governors or University
Presidents or Deans) invariably must make decisions about hiring
promotion, and retention of public professors based on the content
(even the viewpoint) of what these professors ay and write. The
questions asked at hiring and promotion stages-are the professor's
expressed views scientifically plausible, supported, rigorously rea-
soned, adequately attentive to counterargument, etc.-are, at their
core, content-based. Perhaps a line could be drawn between deci-
sions based on academic rigor and decisions based on partisan poli-
tics, but this is a hard line to hold. For example, many people think
that the initial constitutional challenge to Obamacare was weak ana-
lytically (even though it ultimately got four votes at the Supreme
Court)." If, five years ago, I (assuming I were at that time a high-level
9 Id. Notice that saying private professors enjoy more freedom than public ones
does not mean that private professors enjoy more freedom than other private
individuals. It is often asserted that "academic freedom" gives special rights to
academics, but it is far from clear whether judicial doctrine backs that claim up,
at least as a First Amendment matter.
10 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983); and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (illustrating the
latitude the government has to regulate the expressive activity of its employees
in different government employment contexts).
11 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For one essay
(before the court's ruling) explaining the weakness of the plaintiffs' challenge,
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administrator) decided not to go forward with someone's tenure be-
cause I thought her article laying out what she thought was a forceful
constitutional challenge to Obamacare was poor scholarship, would I
be guilty of violating her academic freedom?
Some lines can be drawn. For an administrator to attach neg-
ative career consequences to a faculty member's political lobbying
efforts against Obamacare undertaken after the workday is a differ-
ent matter. A dean cannot punish faculty for giving money to Donald
Trump or to Hillary Clinton. That is private expressive activity, and
even public professors are entitled to it.12
But (and this is the second reason that public professors may
enjoy less latitude than other public employees) out-of-school
speech can sometimes affect credibility in school, and the Picker-
ing/Connick/ Waters line of cases recognizes that government may
sometimes take account of "off-the-job" expression in deciding
whether a person is fit to perform a public job.13 If a street cleaner is
a leader in the local chapter of the KKK outside of school, he is not
(by virtue of his KKK activities alone) incapable of being an effective
street cleaner. But if a public university professor is a KKK leader,
can he really be effective in teaching black students in a public uni-
versity school? Even the report by the University of Illinois Commit-
tee on Academic Freedom and Tenure on the Salaita matter (which
contained significant criticism of the U of I administration) tried to
distinguish between "civility," which was too vague a basis on which
to rescind a faculty job offer, and "professional fitness," on which off-
the-job and private expressive activities could reasonably bear.14 If
this is so, given the inherent nature of a professor's job as having to
deal with a wide range of students in settings of mutual trust, public
see Vikram D. Amar, Reflections on the Doctrinal and Big-Picture Issues Raised by
the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Obamacare), 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 9 (2010).
12 Even under the restrictive Hatch Act (which limits certain off-hours political
activities of federal employees), campaign contributions are permitted. See Po-
litical Activity and the Federal Employee, U.S. Office of Special Counsel,
http://www.cdc.gov/about/ethics/pdf/lunch-andlearn/haflyer.pdf (last vi-
sited Feb.28, 2016).
1s See, e.g., Pereirav. Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2000).
14 See CAFT Report, supra note 2, at 2 3-29.
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professors must be more careful than many (or perhaps even most)
other public employees in what they say and do, even when they are
away from the worksite.
Given the three comparisons I have offered in which public
professors fare worse than their counterparts, the very term "aca-
demic freedom" as applied to the public professoriate may seem in-
apt-usually we think of "freedoms" as especially generous liberties
or licenses, not watered-down versions. Yet, there are at least three
important ways in which public professors do enjoy special "aca-
demic freedoms" that are worth mentioning before I conclude.
First, even within the federal Constitution, there may be pro-
tections that arise not from the First Amendment, but from due
process/notice principles. Most people talk about academic freedom
in terms of a freedom to express, but perhaps the better approach is
to think about it as a freedom to know what you can and can't ex-
press. Vagueness and notice protections do have special applicability
to the public education setting (both at universities and at secondary
schools-think about K-12 teachers who get in trouble for teaching
controversial topics in ways later deemed improper by local authori-
ties). Courts do and should make sure that public professors are not
misled into expressing themselves in ways that later could result in
their demise. We need (and the Constitution may require) clear ex-
ante standards that eliminate chilling effects for public academics if
the public academy has any meaningful role to play in democracy.
Thus, as Eugene Volokh has pointed out, one of the most
troubling aspects of the UC's microaggression guidance document
(even if the UC can constitutionally define and punish microagres-
sions quite broadly) is the chilling effect the inscrutability of the
document creates.15 Even if government has the authority to control
the expression of its public professors, it should have to do so clearly
to avoid due process problems and also so that it takes the political
heat for its censorial decisions. In a related vein, in the Salaita affair,
1s See Eugene Volokh, UC Teaching Faculty Members Not to Criticize Race-Based






putting aside the First Amendment, one of Mr. Salaita's strongest
claims may have arisen from implicit promises made in the offer let-
ter he received about the extent to which his freedom of expression
would be allowed.16 There may be a freedom to know the conse-
quences of speech even when there is no freedom to speak.
Coming back to the actual right of expression, both episodes
may suggest yet another important kind of academic freedom-
freedom that is grounded not in free speech or clear notice prin-
ciples, but in non-constitutional sources altogether. As I mentioned
earlier, state constitutions, contract law, industry practice, and the
like may give rise to legally binding rules that protect public profes-
sors, even as the contours of such rules are going to vary by state and
by university and perhaps also by campus or even department Aca-
demic freedom may be an important idea even apart from any con-
stitutional footing it enjoys.
Finally, public professors enjoy "free" speech in a very po-
werful sense of that term-the speech they undertake is free in that
it is publicly subsidized, and they don't have to pay for it themselves.
Most often, when we think about free speech we mean freedom from
government intrusion, not freedom from market pricing (as when
we refer to a "free lunch"). But, in today's real world, market con-
straints are often more meaningful than government limits. This is
true in electoral politics, and also true in academic research and dis-
covery. In the latter half of the twentieth century, state governments
(and also the federal government through various federal agencies)
accounted for a huge share of the necessary financial support for the
expressive work done by America's public universities and colleg-
es.17 Alas, that seems to have changed over the last few decades (es-
pecially with respect to funding at the state level, where costs have
been shifted to students and their families)," and if our ultimate goal
16 The offer letter could be read to have incorporated academic freedom prin-
ciples embodied in the policies of the American Association of University Pro-
fessors.
17 See National Science Board, Trends and Challenges for Public Research Uni-
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is a high volume of creative, provocative and cutting-edge discovery
and expression, the fiscal element is as or more important than the
regulatory.
